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INTRODUCTION 
The religious ministry, together with medicine and the law, is one of the oldest 
professions. Like other professions, ministers of religion have particular rules that 
govern their behaviour. But unlike other professions, the clergy of the Church of 
England, formerly of the Church of Rome, have an entirely separate legal system 
dedicated to the regulation of their conduct, both within the working environment and 
outside it. 
The accountability of the clergy under canon law,1 in addition to the dictates of 
secular law, creates a disciplinary procedure that is without parallel in other 
professional spheres. For example, an infringement of the general criminal law by a 
clergyperson may result not only in prosecution in the secular courts, but also 
proceedings in the quasi-criminal jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts. Similarly, 
where proceedings in the secular courts establish the irretrievable breakdown of the 
marriage of a clergyperson, this may give rise to disciplinary procedures in the church 
courts, with legally enforceable consequences. This situation is partly the result of the 
historical evolution of the two legal systems, as outlined below; but it is also partly a 
concomitant of the particular role that is occupied by members of the clergy. 
Expectations of parishioners, who contribute to the costs of ministry, and expectations 
of members of society in general, suggest that higher standards of conduct are 
demanded of the clergy than of the laity, and their misdemeanours are dealt with by 
force of law, rather than self-regulation as in other professions. 
Although it is usually matters relating to sexual or financial misconduct that attract 
attention, the system of clergy discipline also extends to matters such as dress, 
swearing, drinking, and detailed regulations concerning the liturgy and church services. 
Clergy are also subject to complex regulatory provisions relating to furnishings and 
ornamentation of churches and care of church buildings.2 
Apologists for the disciplinary system have argued that a punitive system is necessary 
for the sake of the community, so that "scandal is avoided and the delinquent 
understands that the authorities in the church have a prior responsibility to safeguard 
the common good of the faithful".3 Whether the system of regulation that has evolved 
is an appropriate means to achieve this end is another matter. 
Public awareness of this separate system and of matters of clergy discipline tends to 
be limited, but occasionally attention is drawn to the difficulties associated with this 
area of law. For example, in the nineteenth century, the emergence of the Oxford 
Movement and the Tractarians engendered public interest and controversy.4 This led 
to changes in legislation, the prosecution of clergy in the criminal courts in respect of 
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the conduct of worship in church, and the use of the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council as a forum for debate in theological and doctrinal matters. In this century, the 
debate leading to the enactment of the Clergy Discipline Measure 2003 has resulted in 
a resurgence of interest in the topic. 
This article discusses some of the issues surrounding clergy disciplinary procedures 
in the Church of England,5 beginning with an examination of the most readily 
identifiable sources of law by which the conduct of the clergy has been regulated, these 
being the legislation of the Church of England, the decisions of the courts, and 
parliamentary legislation. Special attention is given to the nineteenth century statutes 
and cases as these throw into sharp focus the complex relationship between the secular 
and the ecclesiastical legal systems. It is then possible to consider some of the current 
disciplinary regulations, with an overview of the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 
1963 and the newly enacted Clergy Discipline Measure 2003. This study will give some 
indication of the difficulties that abound when the subtleties of professional conduct 
must be regulated by statute and case law. 
SOURCES OF L A W . LEGISLATION OF T H E C H U R C H 
Lord Blackburn, in the case of Mackonochie v Lord Penzance6 remarked that the 
ecclesiastical law of England "is not a foreign law. It is part of the general law of 
England - of the common law in that wider sense which embraces all the ancient and 
approved customs of England which form law". The origins of ecclesiastical law are 
indeed ancient, for they can be traced back to at least four centuries before the 
Reformation, to the evolution of the canon law of the Western or Catholic church.7 In 
the 12th century, at the time when the common law of England (ie common to the 
whole country) was emerging, the universal law of the church (with the Pope at its 
head) was also developing into a parallel system which was held to apply to all 
Christians in all places, parts of which were expressly or by custom adopted in this 
country. The existence of this canon law alongside the common law resulted in 
numerous disputes over the next 200 years, as clerics and common lawyers argued over 
the extent of their respective jurisdictions. 
At the Reformation, this body of canon law was not abolished, although appeals to 
the Pope were no longer possible. Instead, these provisions received statutory 
recognition, and remained in force except where "repugnant, contrarient or 
derogatory" to common law, statute or royal prerogative.8 As a result, this part of the 
ecclesiastical law was said to be as much binding law as any other legislation, for 
clergy, laity and those outside the Church of England alike. 
Canons 
Further legislation of this type followed in the form of the Canons Ecclesiastical of 
1603. The Canons were the product of the ancient legislative Convocations (meetings 
of the clergy) of Canterbury and York, and according to Richard Hooker, were 
made by "instinct of the Holy Ghost".9 The Canons reproduced some of the 
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pre-Reformation canon law, and gave directions on divers matters relating to the 
conduct of the clergy, both on and off duty. As such, it seemed that these Canons 
would be rules for the clergy only, binding in spiritual matters, but the inclusion of 
regulations concerning marriage, the qualifications of schoolmasters, and other material 
that did not relate solely to the clergy led to some debate as to whether the 1603 
Canons were also binding upon the laity. The debate was apparently resolved by the 
case of Middleton v Crofts,10 which is regarded as authority for the principle that the 
Canons of 1603 were binding on the clergy, and on the laity in so far as declaratory 
of the ancient law and usage of the Church of England, but not otherwise. Lord 
Hardwicke C J justified this distinction on the basis that in contrast to much of the 
Tudor legislation affecting the church, these provisions had never received confirmation 
from parliament. In addition, members of the laity were not represented in Convoca-
tion at the time of the Canons and therefore could not be bound by them. 
The 1603 Canons were revised and extended in 1964 and 1969, and the power to 
legislate by Canon was transferred from the convocations to the principal governing 
body of the Church of England, the General Synod (formerly known as the National 
Assembly).11 The status of these Revised Canons Ecclesiastical, as amended from time 
to time by Synod, was the subject of correspondence in the Ecclesiastical Law Journal 
in July 1995 and January 1996. In the 1995 edition 12 it was pointed out by Oswald 
Clark that as the "ordinary man in the pew" (sic) did not subscribe to the Canons, then 
they would appear to apply only to the clergy or to particular classes of persons 
addressed by the provisions. In the same edition,13 Brian Hanson, an authoritative 
voice in the field of ecclesiastical law, pointed out that Middleton v Crofts had settled 
the issue with regard to the canons made by Convocation. However, Hanson then 
offered the opinion that as under the Synodical Government Measure 1969, power to 
make canons had passed to General Synod, on which body members of the laity were 
represented, all canons passed by the General Synod should be binding on them. 
Indeed Lord Hardwicke's other main reason in Middleton v Crofts for excluding the 
laity from the effect of the Canons, that is, the lack of approval of Parliament, was 
addressed in the Synodical Government Measure of 1969, which requires the assent 
and licence of the Queen before canons may be promulgated. 
Whatever doubt there may be as to whether the Canons bind the laity, there is no 
doubt about the fact that the Revised Canons bind the clergy. In Bland v Archdeacon 
of Cheltenham,14 Sir Cecil Havers, the Deputy Dean of the Court of Arches, 
commented that the 1969 Canons "have statutory authority through a Church 
Assembly Measure passed through Parliament". This version of the Canons imposes 
duties on the clergy in relation to their professional conduct, their home life, and even 
their dress. There are also regulations concerning forms of service and doctrine, which 
are given statutory force by the Church of England (Worship and Doctrine) Measure 
1974, and are enforceable through the ecclesiastical courts under the Ecclesiastical 
Jurisdiction Measure 1963 (as amended). It is the measures of the Church of England 
that regulate such matters as the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts, the 
appointment of incumbents of parishes, and the disciplinary system for the clergy. 
There are two key measures concerned with clergy conduct: the Ecclesiastical 
Jurisdiction Measure 1963 (as amended) and the Clergy Discipline Measure 2003. Both 
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of these will be examined in greater detail later in the article, but it is interesting to note 
at this point the legal status of measures of the Church of England. 
Measures 
In common with canons, measures of the Church of England are the product o f the 
legislative process of the General Synod. Their legal status is however quite different 
from that of the Canons, for they are the primary legislation of Synod, and have the 
force and effect of an Act of Parliament. They are therefore binding on all, clergy and 
laity, members of the Church of England and non-members alike. Once passed by 
Synod, measures must be submitted to the Parliamentary Ecclesiastical Committee, 
which consists of representatives of both Houses of Parliament, for consideration and 
report. The committee report and the measure must then be laid before both Houses, 
and be presented to the Queen for Royal Assent. 
In an increasingly secular, pluralist and multi-cultural society, the fact that the rules 
of a religious organisation can acquire the binding force of statute law, by making use 
of the legislative process of the government, may seem an extraordinary anomaly. But 
this is, of course, one of the many curious consequences of the Reformation and the 
resultant Establishment of the Church of England. The fact of Establishment means 
that the Church of England is recognised as having a particular legal and social status, 
and such of its disciplinary regulations as are contained within its measures acquire 
legal enforceability. 
The drawback to this arrangement from the perspective of the church might be the 
fact that in ecclesiastical matters, the supremacy of parliament is still very much a 
reality. As Briden and Hanson observe,15 " i n the event of unresolved conflict, it is the 
will of Parliament or the Crown which, for good or i l l , prevails", as the Church 
discovered to its cost during the passage through its parliamentary stages of the 
Churchwardens Measure 2001.16 
As with primary parliamentary legislation, the measures also enable the making of 
subordinate legislation in the form of orders and instruments. 
The Book of Common Prayer11 
The case of Martin v Mackonochie18 established three categories of ecclesiastical 
practices: things lawful and ordered; things unlawful and prohibited; and things neither 
ordered nor prohibited expressly or by implication, but the doing of which must be 
governed by the living discretion of some person in authority.19 The category of things 
lawful and ordered is governed, not only by detailed provisions of canon law, but also 
by the Ornaments Rubric in the Book of Common Prayer.20 In the past, the rubrics 
have been held to have the full force of statutory provisions21 gaining their authority 
from the Act of Uniformity 1662. Breach of these rules would therefore constitute an 
offence against ecclesiastical law. 
15
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Although the relevant provisions of the 1662 Act have been repealed, the rubrics 
continue to determine the legality of matters ritual and ceremonial, and the 19th 
century cases must be read in that light. It has since become apparent, however, that 
strict observance of the rules relating to ritual and ceremonial in the Ornaments Rubric 
has not been enforced by the courts. There is thus an interesting divergence between 
law and practice, which was remarked upon in the Report of the Royal Commission on 
Ecclesiastical Discipline 1906.2i 
This is evident from the case of Rector and Churchwardens of Bishopwearmouth v 
Adey24 a case concerning the legality of the practice of reservation of the Sacrament.25 
A complaint had been made that reservation of the Sacrament is forbidden by the 
Thirty Nine Articles of Religion contained in the Book of Common Prayer. The then 
Chancellor of Durham Consistory Court, E Garth Moore, took the opportunity to 
comment on the legal status of the Prayer Book. "The Book of Common Prayer has 
statutory authority. It is a schedule to the Act of Uniformity 1662. Because the Book 
of Common Prayer has statutory authority it does not mean that it is itself a statute." 
Garth Moore argued that the logical consequence is that the Prayer Book should not 
be interpreted in the same way as a statute. He went on to assert that the Book of 
Common Prayer is in the nature of a directive written by clergy for clergy, and it 
should therefore be interpreted liberally according to the occasion. By these means he 
was able to conclude that the reservation of the Sacrament was not forbidden by either 
the Articles or the rubrics of the Book of Common Prayer. 
Quasi-legislation 
According to some commentators, there is an increasing tendency for the activities of 
the Church of England to be controlled by what has been termed "ecclesiastical quasi 
-legislation". This is defined as "extra-legal regulatory instruments informally made by 
a wide range of church bodies",26 and consists of, for example, circulars, directions, 
guidelines, and codes of practice produced by a variety of committees within the 
church. The exact nature and legal status of this type of regulatory material, and 
its binding force, is a matter of some debate. Doe argues that the purpose of such 
regulation is supplementary, to fill in gaps in the formal law, or to provide 
for flexibility in pastoral matters. But he acknowledges the possibility that such 
rule-making may have legal consequences.27 
The sphere of clergy discipline provides a good example of this type of regulation in 
practice. In February 2000, a Joint Committee of the Lower Houses of the 
Convocations of Canterbury and York was set up to prepare a code of professional 
conduct for the clergy. (The Convocations, although no longer having power to create 
canons for the Church of England, continue to meet to consider other matters affecting 
it.) The Joint Committee prepared a draft document which was published for comment 
in February 2002 and debated by both Convocations, before final publication as a 
booklet28 which was commended to the clergy by the Archbishops of Canterbury and 
York. 
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It is interesting to note that although the original motion of Convocation envisaged 
the creation of a code of practice, following legal advice, the word "guideline" was 
substituted for "code". Presumably this was to avoid comparison with other codes that 
have legal significance, such as the Highway Code and the Codes of Practice attached 
to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (as amended). In the preface to the final 
version of the guidelines, the chairman of the working party29 emphasises the fact that 
the guidelines do not form a legal code, and that they are not "commandments set in 
stone". This seems to indicate an awareness on the part of the Committee that there 
is some degree of doubt about the exact legal status of documents such as this. 
However, despite the chairman's disclaimer, many of the guidelines are couched in 
normative terms, and many use the terminology of rights and duties, and it is tempting 
to think that non-observance of the guidelines by a member of the clergy would be 
strongly indicative of behaviour that might result in disciplinary action. 
Whatever doubts there may be about the effect and enforceability of rules of this 
nature, the Clergy Discipline Measure 2003 provides for the continued use of such 
quasi- legislation in the context of clergy discipline. The Measure provides for the 
appointment of a Clergy Discipline Commission consisting of representatives from 
members of General Synod, both clergy and laity, and at least two senior lawyers of 
judicial status. The Commission is charged with the duty to "issue codes of practice 
and general policy guidance to persons exercising functions in connection with clergy 
discipline".30 No indication is given as to whether such codes and policies will be 
binding upon those to whom they are addressed, but Doe sees the proliferation of this 
type of informal rule-making as indicative of a radical increase in ecclesiastical 
regulation generally.31 
SOURCES OF L A W : T H E COURTS 
The history of the church courts in this country can claim to pre-date the history of 
the courts of common law and equity, and the interplay between the ecclesiastical and 
the secular courts is complex. For centuries, the clergy of the Church of England have 
been subject to the jurisdiction of both the church and the secular courts. This overlap 
can, however, have undesirable consequences when the secular courts are called upon 
to consider theological matters for which judges have been neither trained nor 
equipped. 
A clergyperson behaving badly in matters of doctrine, ritual or ceremonial may be 
dealt with in the particular church court designated to deal with such matters. But 
where conduct that constitutes a criminal offence is alleged, a member of the clergy can 
be held accountable under the quasi-criminal jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts, in 
addition to any prosecution in the secular courts. The operation of these specialised 
ecclesiastical courts has been described as a system of "gothic complexity".32 
Historical Context 
In order to understand the evolution of the modern system of disciplinary tribunals 
that is introduced by the Clergy Discipline Measure 2003, it is necessary to have an 
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understanding of the history of the ecclesiastical courts. Because of its position as the 
established church, the courts of the Church of England occupy a unique position. As 
Briden and Hanson neatly observe, "the Church's courts are courts of the State and 
the State's courts are courts of the Church".33 
However, Dale characterises the history of the church courts as "a story of gradual 
loss of jurisdiction"34 as many of the matters that would formerly have been regarded 
as the concern of the church courts have been transferred to the secular courts, or 
abolished by statute. For centuries, a plethora of church courts existed, that could 
exercise jurisdiction not only over the clergy, but also over the laity, in matters ranging 
from divorce, probate and defamation, through bigamy and incest to brawling. The 
19th century saw a gradual reduction in the powers of the church courts in respect of 
the laity, but the complexities of the system remained well into the 20th century. 
Until its repeal by the Clergy Discipline Act 1892, the Church Discipline Act 1840 
provided a procedure for the hearing of complaints against clergy. The relevant 
diocesan bishop would issue a commission to five persons, including the Chancellor or 
an Archdeacon or rural dean, to investigate the charge. If the commissioners found a 
prima facie case to be answered, the bishop could pronounce summary sentence or 
proceed to a full hearing in the consistory court. Here the bishop would sit with three 
assessors, assuming the roles of judge and jury. Alternatively the case might be referred 
to the Provincial Court, that is, the Chancery Court of York (for cases arising in the 
northern Province) or the Court of Arches (for cases arising in the Province of 
Canterbury). Ultimately the parties could appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council. 
The 19th century provides a number of cases that are illustrative of the singular 
workings of the ecclesiastical courts, and the interplay with parliament and the 
temporal courts. The catalyst for this was the controversy engendered by the Oxford 
or Tractarian Movement, which began in 1833 and developed over the next fifteen to 
twenty years into an Anglo-Catholic revival.35 The doctrinal questions raised by 
disputes between the Tractarians and the Evangelicals resulted in legal proceedings 
against clergy who were accused of not holding to the declared doctrine of the Church 
of England. Although these proceedings began in the ecclesiastical courts, the final 
court of appeal for doctrinal cases was the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 
and thus as Sparrow Simpson observes, in these judgments "the respective authority of 
the secular and the spiritual is apparent in its acutest form".36 
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
One of the most celebrated cases was that of Gorham v Bishop of Exeter?1 which began 
as proceedings in the Arches Court of Canterbury in a cause of duplex querula.38 In 
1847, the Lord Chancellor, Lord Cottenham, offered the living of the parish of 
Bramford Speke in Devon to the Revd George Cornelius Gorham. The Bishop of 
Exeter refused to proceed with the appointment, however, on the grounds that Gorham 
held views of unsound doctrine relating to the Sacrament of Baptism. It was alleged 
33
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that Gorham had expressed the view (contrary to the Articles of Religion of the 
Church of England)39 that spiritual regeneration was not given or conferred at Baptism 
and that infants do not automatically become members of Christ by Baptism.40 The 
Arches Court found in favour of the bishop, and Gorham appealed to the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council. 
Six eminent lawyers heard the appeal, with three bishops in attendance. Lord 
Langdale, giving judgment, pointed out the Privy Council was not being asked to 
consider whether Gorham's views were theologically sound or unsound, but whether 
his opinions were contrary to the Articles of Religion of the Church of England.41 
This Court has no jurisdiction or authority to settle matters of faith, or to determine what 
ought in any particular to be the doctrine of the Church of England. Its duty extends 
only to the consideration of that which is by law established to be the doctrine of the 
Church of England, upon true and legal construction of her Articles and Formularies; 
and we consider that it is not the duty of any court to be minute and rigid in cases of this 
sort. 
The decision of the Privy Council was that Gorham's beliefs were not contrary to 
the doctrine of the Church of England and that he should not have been refused 
admission to the living of Bramford Speke. 
The Bishop of Exeter later condemned this as a "perversion of justice".42 It was 
claimed that the Privy Council judgment would allow priests to teach that regeneration 
was an open question in the Church of England, and that the state was attempting an 
interference in spiritual matters, unprecedented in the history of the church.43 Despite 
the careful disavowal by the Privy Council of any attempt to express opinion on the 
theological accuracy of the arguments presented, much criticism was made of the fact 
that judges with no theological training had decided how the Articles of Religion 
should be interpreted. Notwithstanding, the Privy Council continued to constitute the 
final court of appeal for doctrinal matters until its jurisdiction was ended by the 
Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963. 
This was not, however, the end of the litigation arising out of the Anglo-Catholic 
Revival. The latter part of the 19th century saw the development of Ritualism in the 
Church of England. 
Ritualist Prosecutions 
Ritualism developed out of Tractarianism, and particularly from the advanced 
Anglo-Catholic societies that observed the "six points" of Tractarianism.44 The 
Liverpool Mercury of 14 May 1874 claimed that Ritualism was a "religious fanaticism 
generally picked up at the University of Oxford". But it was at Trinity College, 
Cambridge, particularly under the influence of its senior tutor Revd Thomas Thorp, 
where much ritual innovation took place. Thorp had been one of a number of 
vociferous critics of the Gorham judgment. 
Part of the reason for the Ritualist Movement lay in the perceived need for revival 
of a church that had become lax in its worship and discipline. But the chosen means 
39
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(the six points, the use of the sign of the cross and auricular confession) were widely 
condemned as Romish practices. Rival groups formed, represented by, for example, 
the English Church Union (High Church) and the Church Association (extreme 
Evangelicals). These two groups were soon locked in battle over ritual. The Church 
Association instigated prosecutions of clergy on the grounds that Ritualist ornaments 
and practices were inconsistent with the rubrics of the Book of Common Prayer, and 
the English Church Union sought to defend those who were under attack. 
One of the most significant cases was that of Martin v Mackonochie,45 in which the 
Revd Alexander Mackonochie was accused of various Ritualist practices. The case was 
brought under the provisions of the Church Discipline Act 1840, which enabled the 
bishop to try cases himself with assessors, or to send the case to the Court of the 
Archbishop. Mackonochie's case was duly tried before Sir Robert Phillimore, who 
commented that the proceedings were of a criminal character, and noted the harshness 
of this. 
Phillimore's judgment was based on an understanding of the rubrics of the Book of 
Common Prayer as deriving their authority from the Act of Uniformity 1662. It was 
also impressively learned, involving an examination of New Testament passages in the 
original Greek, and discussion of passages from Bede in the original Latin. Phillimore's 
conclusion was the helpful threefold analysis of ecclesiastical procedures referred to 
earlier, and he found that at least three of the practices of which Mackonochie stood 
accused were actually lawful. The Church Association, dissatisfied with this conclusion, 
appealed to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which reversed Phillimore's 
decision and condemned Mackonochie on all points raised against him. Mackonochie 
refused to comply with the judgment, and so in November 1870, the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council suspended Mackonochie for three months. This was 
not, however, the end of the matter. Mackonochie attempted to obtain a judicial review 
of the decision to suspend him from office, and he was also subjected to further 
prosecutions involving the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. 
These cases revealed an interesting interplay between the powers of Church and 
state, and the effect of legal decisions upon members of the Church of England. It was 
claimed by Bishop Fraser46 that the meaning of the ambiguous rubrics in the Book of 
Common Prayer had now been clarified by the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council. But this supposed clarity was achieved at great expense. Mackonochie's case 
took four years and involved five hearings. Moreover, some of the Ritualists simply 
ignored what the Judicial Committee had decided. Two senior Canons of St. Paul's 
Cathedral, Liddon and Gregory, wrote to the Bishop of London47 asserting that the 
Judicial Committee was not a synod of the Church of England, its jurisdiction had 
never been recognised by the church, and that as a matter of conscience, they would 
not comply with its decisions. 
It is interesting to note that many of the Ritualist practices declared illegal by the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council are commonplace in the Church of England 
today. This was recognised in the Report of the Royal Commission on Ecclesiastical 
Discipline in 1906,48 in which it was observed that when a court deals with matters of 
conscience and religion, its judgments will not be effective if they do not carry moral 
authority. Therefore if clergy refuse to recognise the right of the Judicial Committee of 
45
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the Privy Council to pronounce on such matters it would appear to mean that its 
judgments are unenforceable. 
Subsequent legislation has expressly reduced the powers of the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council. The Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963, sections 45(3) and 
48(5) provides that in matters of doctrine, ritual and ceremonial, neither the Court of 
Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved nor a Commission of Review is to be bound by any 
decision of the Privy Council. 
SOURCES OF L A W : P A R L I A M E N T A R Y LEGISLATION 
Clergy of the Church of England are subject to the general law of England as created 
by Parliament through legislation. Some exceptions exist. For example, the case of 
Diocese of Southwark v Coker49 established that clergy do not have a contract of 
employment. Therefore as they are not persons who have a contract of service within 
the Employment Rights Act 1999, section 230 (2), they do not have the benefit of 
employment protection legislation. Neither is the Church of England constrained by 
employment discrimination legislation. As has been seen above, however, in addition 
to general legislation, clergy of the Church of England are subject to specific legislation 
in relation to their conduct. 
Until 1963, in terms of secular parliamentary legislation, discipline of the clergy was 
regulated by the Church Discipline Act 1840, the Public Worship Regulation Act 1874, 
and the Clergy Discipline Act 1892, according to the nature of the offence charged. 
Examination of this legislation, particularly of the Public Worship Regulation Act 
1874, reveals the roots of the 20th century approach to clergy discipline in terms of 
procedure and practice. 
Church Discipline Act 1840 
The Church Discipline Act 1840 could be invoked in cases of crimes and acts of 
immorality committed by clergy but the legislation was also used for the prosecution50 
of Ritualist priests for such matters as "excessive kneeling"51 and the "truly horrible 
offence" of wearing a surplice throughout the service!52 Proceedings could take the 
form of a commission of enquiry consisting of the Diocesan Bishop, the Chancellor of 
the Diocese (who was usually a High Court judge) and senior clergy, or could be 
referred to the Provincial Court to be heard by the Chancellor. 
Public Worship Regulation Act 1874 
In a further attempt to curb the Ritualist movement, the Public Worship Regulation 
Act 1874 ("PWRA 1874") was enacted; more specific offences were created and the 
powers of the Consistory Court were put on a statutory footing. Proceedings could be 
commenced against clergy in this court for such matters as the introduction of illegal 
ornaments, for example candles and frontals, or failing to observe the services laid 
down in the Book of Common Prayer. 
The PWRA 1874, section 8, permitted prosecutions to be instigated by an 
archdeacon or churchwardens, or by any three parishioners. The bishop could at this 
stage stay the action, hear the case himself, or refer it to a judge. Proceedings before 
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a judge took a strict legal form, with evidence given on oath, the judge having the 
powers of a court of record and the ability to enforce attendance of witnesses in the 
same manner as a judge of one of the superior courts of law or equity. The court's 
powers were thus modelled on those of the secular courts, and this fact, together with 
the power of the bishop to veto proceedings53 led to problems in the operation of the 
legislation. 
Within two weeks of the P W R A 1874 coming into force, the Church Association 
against Ritualist priests began a new series of prosecutions. Most of the Ritualist 
clergy decided that the new court set up under the Act, being secular in nature, had 
no jurisdiction over them, and ignored its decisions. When they refused to obey court 
orders (known as monitions) prohibiting them from celebrating communion, the 
complainants claimed that the clergy were in contempt of court, which carried the 
sentence of imprisonment. As a result, five priests, two in London and one each 
in Manchester, Liverpool and Birmingham, served prison terms. This unforeseen 
outcome had the opposite of the desired effect, and invoked public sympathy for the 
Ritualists. 
Meanwhile, the power to veto cases afforded to the bishops by the P W R A 1874, 
section 9, rendered the Act difficult to enforce in some cases. In 1886, Edward King , 
Bishop of Lincoln, refused to permit the prosecution of two priests of his diocese. 
Consequently, the Church Association turned its attention to King himself, and laid a 
complaint before the Archbishop of Canterbury that King had committed Ritual 
offences. Archbishop Benson doubted that he had jurisdiction to act, but was overruled 
by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and accordingly King's case was heard 
in a specially convened hearing at Lambeth Palace. 
The outcome was legally significant, not only because Benson held substantially in 
favour of King , but also because in so doing, he ignored the judgments of the Privy 
Council in previous Ritualist cases. Instead of basing his judgments on recent legal 
precedents, Benson relied on history, citing as authority decisions made at the Council 
of Hatfield in 680 A D . This approach drew attention once again to the continuing 
tension between secular and ecclesiastical law. 
One of the main objections to the P W R A 1874 was that it was perceived as the 
product of Parliament only, the views of the Church Convocations having been 
completely ignored. The issue therefore came to be seen as one of the independence of 
the Church of England. Was the Church of England free to make its own decisions in 
matters of doctrine and worship, or could parliament, as the sovereign law-maker, 
control these matters? A n d was it appropriate that the final appellate authority in 
ecclesiastical causes was a non-ecclesiastical body, that is, the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council? In retrospect, it became clear that the P W R A 1874 was "the most 
unpopular and unworkable of modern Acts of Parliament"54 and that in the case of 
conflict between ecclesiastical power and civil power, clergy would rather go to prison 
than submit to parliamentary sovereignty. 
In the Clergy Discipline Act 1892, parliament again attempted to legislate for the 
behaviour of clergy, this time in the sphere of morality, rather than worship and 
doctrine. The Church Discipline Act 1840 was repealed, and replaced with provisions 
for hearing cases before the Consistory Court. Some attempt was made to define the 
relationship between the temporal courts and the church in relation to clergy 
misbehaviour. The legislation provided that if a member of the clergy was convicted of 
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an offence in a secular court, and sentenced to imprisonment, or i f found to have 
committed adultery in a matrimonial cause, or i f a bastardy order was made against 
him, the bishop would have no discretion but to declare his living vacant and would 
have the option to depose him from holy orders. 
The Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 repealed the 19th century Parliamentary 
legislation, and brought matters of doctrine and discipline firmly within the ambit of 
church authority. However, the legacy of secular influence over church matters can still 
be seen in the 1963 legislation. The remainder of this article will therefore focus on the 
operation of the 1963 Measure, and the subsequent developments in the Clergy 
Discipline Measure 2003. 
R E F O R M A N D T H E E C C L E S I A S T I C A L J U R I S D I C T I O N M E A S U R E 1963 
Between 1883 and 1952, six commissions recommended reform of the ecclesiastical 
courts, culminating (in 1954) in the report of the Archbishop's Commission on 
Ecclesiastical Courts chaired by Lloyd Jacob J , entitled The Ecclesiastical Courts: 
Principles of Reconstruction. The result was the enactment of the Ecclesiastical 
Jurisdiction Measure 1963, ( " E J M 1963") which abolished many obsolete jurisdictions, 
and restructured the hierarchy and functions of the church courts. For example, 
archdeacon's courts, which were virtually defunct, were abolished, and the original 
jurisdiction of the Arches Court of Canterbury and the Chancery Court of Y o r k was 
removed, the latter two courts retaining appellate jurisdiction only. The Measure 
removed the possibility of appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 
disciplinary matters, and abolished the power of the Queen in Council to hear suits of 
duplex querela.55 T o that extent, the Measure attempted to regularise the interplay 
between secular and ecclesiastical legal power. But what the Measure gave with one 
hand it then took away with the other for it provided that nothing in the Measure was 
to affect the prerogative powers of the Crown, nor would it affect the power of the 
High Court to control the proper exercise by the ecclesiastical courts of their 
functions.56 
Statutory force was also given to a distinction that has been of fundamental 
importance in the operation of clergy discipline. Matters of doctrine, ritual and 
ceremonial, were to be dealt with by a different procedure and in a different forum 
from matters of morality, unbecoming conduct, and neglect of duty,57 and this 
dichotomy persists in the new provisions of the Clergy Discipline Measure 2003. The 
court system outlined in the Measure also perpetuated the division of jurisdiction into 
civil and criminal matters. Civil cases comprised the faculty jurisdiction of the courts, 
and clergy discipline, the criminal jurisdiction. 
Unfortunately, as commentators have remarked, the new system of courts and 
procedures introduced by the E J M 1963 was no less complicated than the system 
it replaced, and it was predicted that "it is doubtful whether, in some of its aspects, 
any attempt will be made to use it more than the one time necessary to convince even 
its authors of its unserviceability for many of the purposes for which it was 
designed".58 
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The Court System under the EJM 1963: Doctrine Cases 
The E J M 1963, section 14 (l)(a) provided that proceedings could be instituted against 
members of the clergy for any offence against the laws ecclesiastical involving matters 
of doctrine, ritual or ceremonial. This provision was designed to regulate liturgical 
activity, and is therefore the successor to the legislation that enabled the prosecution 
of the Ritualist priests. It would also cover credal matters, such as denying the doctrine 
of the Trinity or the deity of Christ. 
Proceedings were to be commenced with the laying of a complaint before the 
Diocesan Registrar by an authorised complainant within the terms of E J M 1963, 
section 19, which could include six persons whose names are on the electoral roll of the 
parish church. The bishop had then to give the accused59 and the complainant the 
opportunity for a private interview with him.60 The bishop could at that stage decide 
to take no further action, but if he did proceed with the case, the next step was a 
Committee of Inquiry. Again, the Committee could dismiss the case at that stage, or 
it could refer it to the Court of Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved, a court newly created 
by the Measure, and consisting of three diocesan bishops, two lawyers who had held 
high judicial office, and a panel of theological advisers. Appeal from this body lay to 
a Commission of Review consisting of three Law Lords and two House of Lords 
bishops. In the light of the experience of the nineteenth century cases, the ecclesiastical 
legislators took the opportunity to declare in the E J M 1963, section 45(3) that the 
Court of Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved would not be bound by any decision of the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in relation to matters of doctrine and 
ceremonial. 
In the 40 years that this provision has been on the statute book, it has not been 
tested in practice. Given its unwieldy nature, it is perhaps not surprising that there has 
not been one case heard in this court, and anecdotal evidence suggests that bishops find 
other ways of dealing with clergy whose views cause concern. It is however interesting 
to compare the lack of litigation in respect of doctrine, with the abundance of cases 
concerning Faculty applications. Do modern congregations care more about church 
furnishings than they do about the doctrinal and liturgical correctness of their clergy? 
The Court System under the EJM 1963: Conduct Cases 
The E J M 1963, section 14(l)(b) provided that proceedings could be instituted under the 
Measure against incumbents, charging such clergy with any other offence against the 
laws ecclesiastical (apart from doctrine etc) including conduct unbecoming the office 
and work of a clerk in Holy Orders, or serious, persistent or continuous neglect of 
duty. The E J M 1963 did not define these offences, but did expressly exclude political 
opinions or activities from the scope of unbecoming conduct, and excluded political 
opinion from the scope of neglect of duty: apparently leaving political activity as a 
possible basis for a charge of neglect of duty. No definition was provided of "conduct 
unbecoming", but a parallel was available in the Revised Canons.61 Conduct 
proscribed by the Canons could range from drunkenness62 to writing a rude letter to 
a parishioner.63 
As with doctrine cases, proceedings of this nature were commenced by complaint and 
were framed in the language and procedure of the secular criminal courts, a feature 
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that attracted much criticism, given that the charges laid before the Consistory Court 
would not normally have constituted criminal offences. The bishop of the diocese 
would interview the parties, after which an Examiner (a barrister or solicitor) would 
consider whether there was a case to answer, in a manner comparable to committal 
proceedings in the magistrates' court. A case could be dismissed at this stage, or 
referred to the Consistory Court, presided over by the Chancellor (as judge) and two 
clergy and two lay assessors (as jury). The procedure was modelled on that of the 
Crown Court when hearing criminal cases, and could result in conviction and 
sentence.64 Appeal from this court lay to the Provincial Court. 
Between 1963 and 2003, only three conduct cases reached the stage of trial in the 
Consistory Court, the most well known being the trial of the Dean of Lincoln, the Very 
Revd Brandon Jackson, in 1995. This case attracted much publicity and costs of the 
parties and the courts came to little short of £100,000. Small wonder that "there is 
much anecdotal evidence that bishops are unwilling to utilize the 1963 Measure because 
of the cost both in human and financial terms".65 
This reluctance also led to "short cuts" that provided alternative methods of dealing 
with problem clergy. A diocesan bishop could exercise his "pastoral discipline" by 
adding the name of the cleric to the Archbishop's Caution List (sometimes referred to 
as the Lambeth and Bishopthorpe register). Prior to the Clergy Discipline Measure 
2003, the list (the content of which was confidential to the bishops) contained names 
of clergy on whom official censure had been passed, and also names of those in respect 
of whom there was some disciplinary matter or a past history that should be known 
to the bishops. The latter aspect of the List caused concern, as the procedure for 
entering such names, and the types of misbehaviour that would justify this were 
unclear, and the presence of a name on the list would have serious implications for a 
clergyperson seeking a new appointment. The procedural uncertainty, potential 
inconsistency, and lack of opportunity for the erring cleric to plead his or her own case 
made this informal method of discipline at best unsatisfactory, at worst a breach of the 
rules of natural justice. 
A similar lack of clarity surrounded the type of disciplinary proceedings that could 
be taken against clergy who were not incumbents of parishes.66 The E J M 1963 did not 
allow for the fact that increasing numbers of clergy would be appointed to parishes as 
priest in charge on fixed term contracts, rather than as incumbents. The Measure also 
did not take account of the growing number of non-stipendiary clergy.67 Clergy who 
were not incumbents were governed instead by the Revised Canons. Canon CI2, para 
5 allows a bishop to revoke a licence summarily without further process. Clergy may 
appeal to the appropriate archbishop, but from his decision there is no appeal, and this 
has serious implications for any priest in charge who may lose home and livelihood in 
summary fashion. 
Criticisms of the System 
Reference has been made on several occasions to the fact that the system of clergy 
discipline prior to and under the E J M 1963 was modelled on secular criminal 
jurisdiction. The language and procedure surrounding ecclesiastical "offences" was 
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redolent of criminal law, which was inappropriate in cases in which allegations were 
not usually criminal in nature, and would not have given rise to a prosecution under 
secular law. The Ecclesiastical Law Society Working Party on Clergy Discipline and 
Ecclesiastical Courts reported that the proceedings and standard of proof were 
modelled so closely on jury trial in the Crown Court that of necessity they became 
adversarial and combative. The Working Party observed that this could create a 
polarisation of issues and have undesirable consequences for both clergy and 
parishioners.68 
Further serious concerns were voiced by the General Synod report, Under Auth-
ority.69 Because the procedures were complex and rarely used, neither clergy nor 
lawyers were well versed in the legislation, and such expertise as there was varied 
considerably from diocese to diocese. Despite the availability of ecclesiastical legal aid, 
costs were prohibitive, and the public nature of the proceedings often gave rise to a 
"media circus". Similarly, it was often difficult, if not impossible, to find local assessors 
to sit in the Consistory Court who had not already heard about the case, or who did 
not know the accused personally. 
The advent of the Human Rights Act 1998 also had serious implications for 
proceedings under the 1963 Measure. Mark Hil l 7 0 noted that the role of the bishop 
combined elements of investigator, prosecutor and judge, which would contravene the 
principles of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The role of 
the bishop also gave rise to concern in that his pastoral role as "Father in God" to 
the clergy would be compromised by the disciplinary role imposed on him under the 
Measure. 
In November 1992, the General Synod Standing Committee recommended that a 
Working Party be established to review clergy discipline and the work of the courts. 
The report was published in 199671 and recommended that the Church of England 
should make a radical revision of its disciplinary structures. Over the next five years, 
an implementation group worked on the draft measure, and it was referred to the 
Parliamentary Ecclesiastical Committee in 2001. The Clergy Discipline Measure 
2003 eventually received the Royal Assent on 10 July 2003, and is being brought into 
force in stages. 
C L E R G Y DISCIPLINE M E A S U R E 2003 
The new Measure originally rejoiced in the title of the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction 
(Discipline) Measure, but mercifully this was changed at draft stage. The Report of the 
General Synod Working Party72 had recommended that matters of doctrine be dealt 
with by the same legislation that would deal with matters of conduct. However, a vote 
in General Synod resulted in doctrine cases being excluded from the ambit of the new 
system. At present therefore, the Court of Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved still has 
jurisdiction in matters of doctrine, ritual and ceremonial under the provisions of 
the 1963 Measure that have survived repeal by the Clergy Discipline Measure 2003, 
section 7 ( "CDM 2003"). A Working Party set up by the House of Bishops has been 
considering how best to deal with such cases, and the press has excitedly but 
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misleadingly suggested that "heresy trials" are planned. The draft Clergy Discipline 
(Doctrine) Measure will be debated by General Synod in July 2004, and will propose 
the introduction of a doctrinal disciplinary tribunal for matters not dealt with by C D M 
2003. 
Procedure under Clergy Discipline Measure 2003 
The C D M 2003 is intended to provide a "new, modern and workable structure for 
clergy discipline in non-doctrinal cases".73 The most fundamental change concerns the 
replacement of the Consistory Court with a "bishop's disciplinary tribunal" for each 
diocese.74 Proceedings may be instituted against a priest or deacon by written 
complaint.75 The new provisions make no distinction between incumbents and priests 
operating on a licence from the bishop. Such a complaint may be made by a two-thirds 
majority of the parochial church council, or by a churchwarden or any other person 
with a "proper interest" in making it. 
Time limits are imposed within which the Diocesan Registrar makes a preliminary 
scrutiny of the complaint and reports to the bishop. The bishop has a range of options 
including dismissing the complaint, penalty by consent, or a formal investigation under 
the C D M 2003 section 17. A possible outcome may be a hearing before the disciplinary 
tribunal consisting of two members of the clergy, two laity, and a legally qualified 
chairman. Rights of appeal to the president of tribunals76 are available to both sides 
during the preliminary stages of the process, and the respondent (no longer the 
accused) may appeal to the Provincial Court against any penalty imposed.77 Decisions 
of the tribunal are also open to judicial review by the secular courts. 
The new Measure attempts to address many of the concerns that dogged the E J M 
1963. Under the previous legislation, there was no effective filter to stop proceedings 
at an early stage, due to the lack of clear guidance to the bishops in this area. Under 
the new Measure, the introductory sifting procedure has been borrowed from 
disciplinary proceedings in other professions, and enables the Diocesan Registrar to 
consider the quality of the evidence and the locus standi of the complainant at an early 
opportunity. The Parliamentary Ecclesiastical Committee, commenting on the C D M 
2003, pointed out that this could add considerably to the work of the Registrar, and 
underscores the need for that person to be not only a qualified lawyer, but also 
well-versed in ecclesiastical law.78 The advantage is, however, that this supplies the 
opportunity for malicious claims to be identified and dealt with speedily. 
The newly proposed tribunal is modelled on secular tribunals. Decisions are by 
majority vote after a private hearing. Members of the tribunal will not come from the 
same diocese as the respondent. In contrast with proceedings under the E J M 1963, the 
standard of proof will be the same as that in proceedings in the High Court in the 
exercise of its civil jurisdiction, again following the trend set by disciplinary proceedings 
in other professions. 
The question of the appropriate standard of proof was the subject of discussion in 
General Synod, in terms of attempting to balance the right of the clergy to a safe 
decision, with the right of congregations to be protected from errant clergy. The 
decision to adopt the civil law standard was in the event taken on the basis that this 
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was thought to be more flexible than the criminal standard, the degree of probability 
varying according to the seriousness of the matter in question.79 
Grounds for Proceedings 
It is still possible to recognise the provisions of the E J M 1963 in the wording of the 
grounds for complaints. Thus in the C D M 2003, section 8, neglect of duty and conduct 
unbecoming still form the basis of the regulation of clergy conduct. The language of 
criminal offences has been removed, in response to previous criticism, but worryingly, 
the type of behaviour that may be denned as misconduct appears to have been 
broadened. Neglect of duty need no longer be "serious, persistent or continuous" to 
constitute misconduct, and "inefficiency in the performance of duties" has been 
introduced as a ground for proceedings. Similarly, conduct that is not necessarily 
unbecoming, but is "inappropriate" may bring members of the clergy within the 
disciplinary provisions. This represents a departure from the E J M 1963, and it will be 
interesting to see whether the result is an increase in complaints against clergy, as 
behaviour that would not previously have been grounds for complaint is brought 
within the ambit of the legislation. 
Involvement in a divorce, or conviction of a criminal offence by a secular court 
continue to be matters which may give rise to disciplinary proceedings as they did 
under the E J M 1963. 
Statutory Innovations 
The C D M 2003 provides for the creation of a body new to ecclesiastical law, the Clergy 
Discipline Committee. The Committee will give general advice to the disciplinary 
tribunals, and issue codes of practice. This general oversight is designed to provide 
some consistency across the dioceses, and to address the difficulties that were inherent 
in ensuring comparability of decision-making in the Consistory Courts. The Committee 
will be chaired by a person with suitable legal qualifications; for example, having held 
high judicial office. The chairman will also be president of tribunals, and will issue 
practice directions and act as chairman of a disciplinary tribunal where important 
points of law or principle are involved. 
The C D M 2003 attempts to regularise a difficult area from the previous regime, in 
that it places the Archbishop's Caution List on a statutory footing. A duty is imposed 
on the Archbishops by the C D M section 38 to compile and maintain a list of clergy 
who have been subject to disciplinary proceedings, or who have resigned following a 
written complaint. Unfortunately for the clergy, the list can continue to be used to 
name those who have "acted in a manner, not amounting to misconduct, which might 
affect their suitability for holding preferment". N o guidance is given in the C D M 2003 
as to how this procedure is to be interpreted and implemented. The clergyperson has 
the opportunity to ask the president of tribunals to review the decision to place his or 
her name on the list, but once listed, it appears that a name will remain in place for 
at least five years. Again, this will be a matter of some concern to clergy whose 
prospects of obtaining a post may be affected by this provision. 
A further innovative feature of the C D M 2003 is that it provides for the creation of 
a Code of Practice. A s mentioned earlier, the Code of Practice is to be formulated 
by the Clergy Discipline Commission to provide guidance for the purposes of 
the Measure. It was the view of the General Synod Working Party report, 
On the advice of Geoffrey Tattersall QC: Appendix F to the Report by the Revision Committee on the Draft Clergy 
Discipline Measure GS13474. 
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Under Authority, that a Code of Practice would be a way of achieving flexibility of 
procedure in the operation of the disciplinary system. The Working Party was of the 
opinion that a code could give guidance, highlight best practice, and enable procedures 
to be modified as time passes, without the need for amending legislation. The Code will 
thus perhaps address some of the gaps and grey areas that are apparent in the new 
legislation. Whilst these are valid arguments in favour of such a Code, this does 
however introduce greater uncertainty into the administration of ecclesiastical law. On 
the other hand, it provides an opportunity for the ecclesiastical lawmakers to avoid the 
scrutiny of parliament, as the Code of Practice must be laid before General Synod 
before coming into force, but not laid before parliament. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is too early to tell how much difference the new Measure will make to the conditions 
of service of clergy in the 21st century. In part this is because grey areas continue to 
exist in the rules that govern the conduct of clergy. Some of these areas may be 
addressed by the codes of practice, and in this respect ecclesiastical legislation follows 
the trend of secular parliamentary legislation, in providing for "quasi-legislation" to 
"fill in the gaps" more speedily and flexibly than might be the case if amending 
legislation were required. 
The 19th century Ritualist cases provided a dramatic illustration of the consequences 
that arise from the interplay of secular and ecclesiastical law. Whilst the clergy continue 
to be subject to the two separate legal systems, the reduction of the influence of the 
criminal law must be seen as an improvement. What has replaced it seems to be the 
influence of the civil law, with the introduction of tribunals and a civil standard of 
proof. But the acid test of the appropriateness of the new system will be the extent to 
which it achieves the aim set out in the document Under Authority*1 that the 
community of faith might expect quality and accountability from its clergy, and that 
"discipline should be handled firmly, fairly and sensitively and without delay". 
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